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3Introduction
I want to do two things: provide an overview of the refugee
problem itself, and, secondly, provide a review of the way the refugee
problem is being dealt with in the Multilateral Working Group on
Refugees. And I want to look at the first by analyzing the second.
I say analyzing because this will not simply be a descriptive
account. I want to try to help unpack what is happening so we can
ascertain to what degree the refugee problem is or is not being dealt
with. And I am going to use a colourful metaphor, not because I believe
that either the image used or that the identification with that image
is necessarily accurate, but because it is a metaphor, that is, a
juxtaposition which, through identification with an image, clarifies as
well as intensifies the complexity and variety of the matter at hand.
I am going to use an analogy with the Freudian basic structure of the
personality and divide the development of the Multilateral Talks on
Refugees into three phases, an Id phase, a Superego Phase, and an Ego
Phase.
Phase I - The Id Phase
Though 'Id' does not accurately translate Freud's das Es, it is
4the popular term for that descendant of the unconscious with its
identification with instincts and basic passions, with the very body
politic of life, but also with those parts which are unknown and
hidden. It is a realm of teeming chaos, energy without organization,
which is unable to express itself through any collective will. Whatever
gets expressed has much more to do with manifesting underlying passions
than recognizing reality.
The first phase of the Multilateral Talks on Refugees can be
characterized by analogy with allowing the Id to be expressed. This is
important. The Multilateral Talks on Refugees allowed both sides on the
refugee issues to articulate their basic desires and fears. In doing
so, they presented a mask which could, at one and the same time, both
hide and reveal what was at stake.
Since I have outlined what I believe went on in this phase of the
talks elsewhere, more precisely at the Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation Conference in Los Angeles in 1993, and which will appear as
a chapter in a forthcoming book1, I will summarize my conclusions here.
It is well to recall that only two short years ago, the PLO was
regarded as a terrorist organization by the Israelis; in turn, the
Israelis were regarded as oppressors of the Palestinian people. One
5cannot recall that stage without those involved in either side
muttering under their breath, literally, that maybe its still true, at
least the description of the other side. In Moscow, in January of 1992,
the multilateral track of the peace process, or stealth peace process,
was launched to lay the foundations for securing the peace that might
come through the bilateral talks by initiating efforts at cooperation
on arms control and regional security, the environment, water
resources, and regional economic cooperation and development. When the
Palestinians threatened to boycott those talks, the Americans agreed to
launch a fifth set of multilaterals to deal with refugees. The very
fact that the refugee talks had to be launched through threats and
pressure is enough to indicate that the refugee issues and the
multilateral talks dealing with refugees would be different than the
four other sets of multilateral talks.
After all, the multilateral talks on the other four areas deal
with resolving issues to secure the peace. However, unless the refugee
issue is dealt with, there will be no real peace. Resolving the issue
of refugees is a precondition of peace and not just a benefit to
follow. More significantly, the refugee issue goes to the heart of the
matter, the right of every individual to belong to a state and live in
a territory where his or her life will be protected and their dignity
as human beings who are members of a nation will be recognized. The
6issue is not only equal respect and mutual recognition, but the right
of each of the peoples involved to have the means for protecting and
giving dignity to all their members so that they can take
responsibility for determining their own survival as a group and the
shape and character of their future.2 In other words, in addition to the
refugee issue being a precondition for peace and not just something to
be resolved to secure the peace, the refugee problem is organically
linked with the political settlement of the Palestinian national cause.
In the first phase of the Multilateral Talks on Refugees - what
I have dubbed the Id Phase - there were three meetings, two in Ottawa
and one in Oslo Norway. Though the talks appeared chaotic and seemed to
show no progress, they were, in fact, the key ground for preparing the
breakthrough in the Israeli/Palestinian negotiations.
In May of 1992, when the Likud government was still in power, the
Israelis refused to attend the first session of the WGR in Ottawa
because the organization of the talks broke the agreement that the
Palestinians would only be represented by persons from the West Bank
(excluding East Jerusalem) and Gaza. But Palestinian refugees were
located not only in the West Bank and Gaza, but in the diaspora. If the
refugees were to be discussed and if those being discussed were to be
represented at the negotiations, then diaspora Palestinians had to be
7at the table to discuss the refugee issue. 
The first set of talks in Ottawa in May of 1992 confirmed that
recognition, with the Israelis following suit by agreeing to attend the
second talks. The first fundamental breakthrough had been achieved -
the Palestinians as a whole, wherever they lived, had been recognized
as a people who had a place at the negotiating table. The issue was not
simply one of inhabitants of a specific territory, but of a people who
were scattered around as refugees.3
If the first set of talks set the foundation for the Palestinians
as a people participating in the peace process in a conflict in which
they are central, the second set of talks, again in Ottawa, in November
of 1992, determined de facto that the representatives of those people
would be the PLO. Ostensibly the Palestinians were part of the
Jordanian delegation. Further, no Palestinian at the talks were to be
members of the PLO. When the head of the Palestinian delegation, in
direct contravention to the agreed rules, turned out to be a prominent
member, not only of the PLO, but of a militant faction of the PLO, the
Israeli delegation walked out. The talks, in effect, turned out to be
a discussion of a face saving formula so the Israelis could return to
the table. This was accomplished when the head of the Palestinian
delegation agreed to resign from the PLO, but not without announcing
8that he would rejoin the next day. Face saving thus became a means of
recognizing who the real faces were at the table, and that not only was
the Palestinian delegation a unit quite independent of the Jordanian
one, but that the PLO was the body representing the Palestinians.
In Oslo in May of 1993, the real purpose and most fundamental
purpose of the talks came to the fore. They were the disguise and mask
behind which the most fundamental breakthroughs in the conflict between
the Israelis and the Palestinians were occurring. Only this time it was
even behind the backs of the delegates at those talks. While finally
getting down to defining an ambitious plan for refugee talks, the
respective Palestinian and Israeli delegations seemed not only to have
lost their ardour and to have become reconciled to dealing with one
another directly as equals, but they also seemed preoccupied and
distracted. Little did the participants in the multilateral talks know
that, in fact, the breakthrough in the negotiations was occurring right
in the kitchen of the Foreign Minister of Norway while the delegates to
the Multilaterals met elsewhere in Oslo as his more formal guests.
Two Norwegian researchers, the sociologist Terje Roed Larsen and
his research director, Marianne Heiberg (who, in addition to being the
Research Director of the FAFO team, was also the wife of the Norwegian
Foreign Minister, Johan Joergen Holst), had been conducting a survey of
9Palestinian living conditions. The results of the study was known as
FAFO. The report of the research team was on the agenda of the
Multilateral Refugee Working Group on Refugees in the meetings
scheduled in Norway in May of 1993. Unbeknownst to those involved in
the Working Group negotiations, including the Canadian "gavellers" of
those talks or the American co-chair, the Jordanian, and probably even
the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, the Multilateral talks in
Norway were used as the cover for the "back-door" talks where the
breakthrough in those secret negotiations first occurred.
Subsequently, the Oslo Accords or Declaration of Principles were
signed and announced to the surprised world. In the agreements, the
Israelis and Palestinians not only recognized one another as peoples
with collective rights, not only recognized the Israeli government and
the PLO as negotiating partners, but also dealt with the refugees. The
implementation of return for the 1967 refugees would be subject to
quadrilateral negotitiations. The right to return to the West Bank and
Gaza, that is, to their homes and their homeland, was recognized for
these refugees. However, the issue of the 1948 refugees was to be left
for the final status negotiations, implying that their right to return
to their homes (not homeland) was not yet recognized, with the
implication they would never be recognized. These refugees belonged to
a different category. Nevertheless, the precedent of the 1967 refugees
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left open the possibility that the right of these refugees to return to
their homeland would be recognized.
III Phase II - The Superego Stage
The Superego or, more accurately, Super-ego, is that part of the
psyche in which there is reflection and observation, but where the
parental mode of reflection and observation is predominant. The
superego is not a manifestation of self-determination and the
assumption of responsibility for a self. Rather, the frame of reference
for the discourse is determined by parental guidance. However, key
elements of the discourse will relate to the Id, the repressed and
unconscious elements of the struggle which are not being faced.
Critical remnants of a past trauma are still being ignored as effort is
concentrated on dealing with present problems as humanely as possible.
But there is a fundamental contradiction between the humanitarian
issues being dealt with and the underlying issues which are being set
to one side.
Thus, although this phase exemplifies a much higher level of
functioning of control, planning and rational analysis, the Id elements
of the desire for self-determination and full recognition continue to
haunt all the discussions. We can document all the breakthroughs that
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occurred in Tunis in October of 1993 where the delegates, with the
Hotel Hilton all to themselves, had its apparently best meeting and
allocated responsibilities among the various parental states for
providing guidance and leadership in dealing with each of seven themes.
Groups were set up to deal with data bases, human resources
development. job creation and vocational training, public health, child
welfare, social and economic infrastructure, and, last but by no means
least, family reunification.4 And one can tell where the underlying
problems still manifested themselves in these areas of rational
planning - for it was the area where political negotiations rather than
technical analysis were predominant. François Sénémaud replaced his
French predecessor to attempt to deal with the touchy subject of family
reunification.
The reason it is touchy is not only because it overlaps with the
issue of return, but because the issues are symbolic as well - relating
to "family" and  "reunification." After all, at root, the fundamental
issue is that the Palestinian people regard themselves as a family is
some sense, mutually responsible for their own self-development.
Further, it is a divided family, scattered and dispersed. The Israelis
have always recognized the right to family reunification on
humanitarian grounds. But they have also feared the use of the rubric
of family reunification as a cover for exercising the right of return.
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There is no question that progress has been made under parental
guidance. Problems have been assessed, projects have been approved, and
money has been allocated. This can be seen in the Swedish analysis of
the situation of children and youth in Gaza and the West Bank in the
child welfare area to which Sweden has allocated $2 million dollars, in
Italy's survey of public health and the establishment of technical
units to coordinate the efforts in these areas, in the US assessments
of priorities in human resource development for refugees and the pilot
projects already established, and in the EU prioritization of
assistance programs for refugees. Canada has focused its efforts on
Jordan, Lebanon and Syria and allocated funds for education, health and
housing. (See Appendix I for a summary of the responsibilities and
progress as of the beginning of the summer of 1994 on each of these
themes.)
But the sixth session of the refugee talks scheduled for Turkey
in December can no longer avoid at least setting a foundation for
resolving and negotiating the central issue - the political status of
the Palestinian refugees and alternative solutions for diaspora
refugees, including integration into the host countires as well as
possible settlement abroad. But such steps cannot be undertaken if they
prejudice Palestinian national rights or the rights of the individual
refugees to receive compensation.
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IV Phase III - The Ego
In contrast to the Id, the Ego is organized. Further, instead of
being driven primarily by desires and dreams, the Ego responds and
adjusts to the realities of the external world. Unlike the Superego
where parentalism (a non-sexist version of paternalism, but with the
connotation of care and nurture) predominates, the Ego determines its
own destiny and assumes responsibility for the destiny of the Self.
Further, whereas the Superego continues to ignore the dreams and
desires of the Id, the Ego takes them into account, deals with them
forthrightly, harnesses the energy of those passions, and directs them
in ways which take cognizance of the realities faced. 
Up until now, the Palestinian refugee problem has never been dealt
with without either the passions of the Id or the parentalism of the
Superego predominating. The passions of the Palestinians on this issue
are unmistakable; they insist that they have the right to return and it
is their choice whether they accept compensation or not. Resolution
194, reinforced by international human rights law, is cited as legally
reinforcing this conviction. This is in spite of the fact that:
a) the origins of the conception at Rhodes in August of 1948 was that
of the very paternalistic Count Folke Bernadotte and not the
Palestinian refugee community;
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b) the Palestinian refugee community did not originally seek return and
the Arabs did not initially support resolution 194;
c) Resolution 194 was a watered down version of Bernadotte's 'right of
return' and was a moral injunction rather that a statement of right.5
It reads "should be permitted" and not "must be permitted" or,
alternatively, that the refugees have the right to return.6  
Except in understanding the underlying passions, none of this
matters because the UN subsequently certainly endorsed return as a
right. In any case, it has become an integral part of the dream and
vision, not only of the refugees, but of the basic passions of the
Palestinians. In other words, the origins and early history of the
belief are far less relevant than the way the belief is now held. The
passions on this issue are exacerbated when the Palestinians observe
Jews (and some non-Jews) from Russia exercising a right of return
denied them.
On the Israeli side, passions are equally strongly at work, but
passions of denial, whether it concerns how the refugees came to be
refugees in the first place or the prospect of any return as a matter
of right. Further, dominating the Israeli pool of passions is the fear
that return will be used to undermine the security of the state and the
demographic preponderance of Jews in that state.
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If the Palestinians and Israelis have been determined in their
postures on this issue by their desires and fears, the international
community has adopted a parentalist Superego perspective from the very
beginning. Immediately following the 1948 war, the international
community attempted to deal with the Palestinian refugee issue by
setting up UNRWA and using economic means to integrate the Palestinians
into the local community where they had sought asylum. The creatively
ambiguous phrase for handling that solution was called "economic
integration." Quite aside from the political objectives, the economic
megaprojects and then the follow-up micro-projects for settling the
refugees were failures. If UNRWA had not begun its extensive efforts in
education by 1960, UNRWA would have gone down in history as a great
failure instead of ending up with the credit for developing the
Palestinians into the best educated Arabs in the Middle East.7
If the Working Group on Refugees does not tackle the situation of
the Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, then it will follow the old
pattern of focusing on humanitarian issues and ignore the central
political questions of return and compensation.8 However, it is very
difficult to see how this can be done. The original Madrid formula
excluded the United Nations as the structural or legal forum for
resolving the conflict in general or the refugee issue in particular.
The DOP envisions discussing the status of the 1948 refugees only after
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the experimental three year phase of autonomy is concluded. Clause 1 of
Article 8 dealing with Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Israeli-
Jordanian agreement states: "Recognising the massive human problems
caused to both parties by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as
the contributions made by them towards the alleviation of human
suffering, the Parties will seek to further alleviate those problems on
a bilateral basis." In other words, the problem is defined as a
humanitarian problem and the resolution is said to reside primarily in
a bilateral forum. Clause 2, however, states that if the problem cannot
be resolved on a bilateral level, then other fora can be used, and the
first of these fora listed is the Multilateral Working Group on
Refugees. But only when the bilateral talks fail. By then it will be
too late.
The implication of the last hurdle was in evidence at the IGCC
Conference on Regional Cooperation in the Middle East in Los Angeles in
1993. When a slight opening had been breached on discussing the right
of return by Palestinians and Israelis - they had agreed to explore the
various meanings of right of return with the possibility Rashid Khalidi
had given in his analysis that it was possible that there could be a
formulation of the right of return which would not threaten the
Israelis - the Jordanian delegation shot that proposal down because
they did not want any wording which jeopardized what they had already
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agreed to in their peace talks with the Israelis.
Thus we have dreams and fears. We have created structural
obstacles not only as a result of those dreams and fears but also in
the process of resolving some of the conflicts. We also have an
international community that has habituated itself to parentalist
humanitarian approaches to the problem. 
This is not to underrate the importance of the $230 million
dollars raised thus far for the first and second phases for projects in
the Gaza and West Bank. But only $10 million has been raised for
projects in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. There is thus an asymmetry in
even the humanitarian aid available for refugees. Further, thud far the
Working Group on Refugees has set aside even assisting the bilateral
talks by preparing documents, studies and alternative options which are
needed for the final status negotiations.
One of the central issue is return. It is an issue of passions and
fears and not reality. First, as a concept, the right of return has
shifted meaning from a right to return to homes to a right to return to
homeland.9 Secondly, the problems of the most important group of
refugees outside the homeland, Palestinians who lack both citizenship
or equal rights of participation in the economic life of the state
18
(Palestinians in Lebanon), and those who lack political rights as in
Syria, have not been dealt with. But, as one Palestinian commentator
from Lebanon opined, even the numbers who might return to the West Bank
would be symbolic; their homes were in what is now northern Israel, and
it is doubtful that, even if given the choice, they would want to move
to Israel. They know they cannot go back. Most lack a connection with
the West Bank let alone crowded Gaza.10 But Lebanon has made clear that
it does not want them, though recent suggestions have been made that
Lebanon might permit a number to stay as part of a package for
resolving the problem; such refugees would be given permanent residence
but their identity would remain Palestinian and they would not be given
citizenship in Syria.
It is possible larger numbers could stay as permanent residents.
But they would still need citizenship. The new Palestinian entity might
satisfy this problem by giving them citizenship, or at least give them
identity documents which could be developed so that they are taken to
be the equivalent to passports. Under those conditions, Lebanon migh be
willing to grant considerable numbers permanent residence status,
particularly if this were part of a package of proposals for a durable
solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. 
There is another problem - UNRWA. As long as UNRWA remains as a
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distinct enterprise for taking care of the health, welfare and
educational needs of the Palestinian refugees, particularly in Gaza and
the West Bank, there can never be a coherent policy in these areas
equally applicable to all Palestinians in the territory. However, as
long as the Palestinian National Authority lacks credibility or
experience in administering the large amount of international funds,
all sides seem to find it convenient to use UNRWA as a conduit for
money from the international community to assist the Palestinians.
Nevertheless, preparations need to be undertaken to enable the
functions of UNRWA to be transferred, first in the West Bank and Gaza,
and subsequently to the governments in the states in which the refugees
have found asylum, but only if the political status of the refugees is
determined.
V Conclusions
What can the Multilateral Working Group do further to assist in
resolving the refugee problem in the Palestinian diaspora? Beyond
reinforcing the peace through projects for refugees in the West Bank
and Gaza, what can the WGR do to assist the refugees not living in the
new Palestinian political entity? Increasing the monies available for
infrastructure, training, etc. will help, but it won't solve the
critical problem of the Palestinians in the diaspora. They need
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security of citizenship. They need a homeland to which they have a
right to return, but if given permission to reside in many parts of the
Arab world, are unlikely to exercise that right. And if still in
refugee camps, they need the means to extract themselves from this
situation.
But these are political problems. What can the WGR do in the
technical area to facilitate such solutions? An inventory of
conditions, practical desires and options could be drawn up. A census
of accurate numbers could be undertaken. A survey of the compensation
needs and the sources available, as well as precedents for adjudicating
compensation claims, could be undertaken given that Resolution 194
required Governments or authorities responsible to pay that
compensation. Many other actions can be undertaken which can assist the
negotiators in the bilateral talks to make choices. (See Appendix II
for the Report of the Workshop on Refugees of the Conference on
Promoting Regional Cooperation in the Middle East held in Vouliagmeni,
Greece, Nov. 4-7, 1994.)
The solution will be a political and not a legal one. Technical
and economic mechanisms can help facilitate the political solution.
None of the parties can afford to allow the refugee problem in the
diaspora to fester without making preparations for advancing the
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unresolved central political issues.
Of course, the multilaterals, in order to advance the peace
process, will focus on concrete humanitarian projects which will not
detract in any way from the bilateral talks dealing with political
issues but will, in fact, facilitate such discussions by allowing
projects to go ahead which will serve as confidence building measures
and demonstration projects on the advantages to all sides of pursuing
the path of peace. Data gathering would not usurp any decisions to be
made at the bilateral talks but could facilitate the process of making
such decisions and determining which concrete projects are worth
developing which could directly contribute to the peace process. For
example, it is important to document how enterprising the Palestinians
have been, how much initiative they have taken to reestablish
themselves in spite of the fact that they have no secure status in
Lebanon. Better statistics on the Lebanese Palestinian refugees are
needed. We need information on their material, educational and
political status.
There may be a need to explore a long term international
commitment to Jordan to pay for integrating and upgrading the UNRWA
health and educational facilities in Jordan so that there is no longer
a perceived dual system, with the clear and explicit corollary that
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such efforts would in no way take away from any right of return, rights
to compensation or any other rights to which the Palestinians are
entitled.
Finally, resettlement opportunities should be explored and made
available to Palestinian families who wish to take advantage of them,
without, of course, taking away any right of return or right to
compensation. For example, a program of resettlement, with Canada
taking the lead, could be launched offering room for 20% of the
refugees in Lebanon to be resettled in Canada over the next five years.
This would mean, at a maximum, 60,000 refugees, or 12,000 refugees per
year, or, given the large size of the families, about 2,000 families.
If 25-50% of the refugees in Lebanon were targeted for potential
resettlement in the West were followed, if Canada took 20% of them,
this would at most only involve 6000 per year over five years or about
1,000 families per year. 
Finally, though UNRWA enjoys wide-spread support and does fine and
commendable work, maintaining its existing level of funding and not
shifting the funds to funnel directly through Palestinian auspices
simply avoids the issue of developing responsible and accountable
institutions run by and for the Palestinians themselves, unless one is
only talking about the very short term. The perpetuation of the problem
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is also reinforced through UNRWA. A consistent and comprehensive
approach could be considered along the following lines. The refugees in
Jordan could be thoroughly integrated and assistance could be funnelled
through the Jordan government in a program of equalization of
standards, a program that might require enhanced and committed funding
to Jordan for such a program of integration and equalization. Such a
program might be balanced against other commitments by Israel to
repatriate certain refugees under the family reunification rubric, for
Western governments to offer resettlement opportunities for refugees in
Lebanon, for citizenship guarantees to be ensured for those refugees in
the new Palestinian entity, and for a compensation program to be
arranged for all refugees. Similarly, a resettlement program for
Palestinians in Lebanon could provide a relocation allowance from the
portion of funds allocated through UNRWA in Lebanon, with a gradual and
proportionate decrease in the UNRWA budget as those refugees are
resettled.
Many other suggestions can be offered. The main point is that the
issues of preparing for some solution to the right of return and
compensation problems must be faced now and integrated with the
humanitarian programs.
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